Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game by Füllbrunn, S.C. & Neugebauer, T.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is an author's version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/112206
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
 1 
 
Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid 
auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
☼ 
 
Sascha Füllbrunn and Tibor Neugebauer 
Forthcoming in Theory and Decision 2013 
 
 
Abstract: The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid 
auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This 
feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We 
consider both within-subject and between-subjects variations. In line with the qualitative risk 
neutral Nash equilibrium prediction, the data show that bids increase in the number of 
bidders. However, in auctions involving a small number of bidders, average bids are above, 
and in auctions involving a larger number of bidders, average bids are below the risk neutral 
equilibrium prediction. The quartile analysis reveals that bidding behavior is not constant 
across the full value range for a given number of bidders. On the high value quartiles, 
however, the average bid-value ratio is not different from the risk neutral prediction. The 
behavior is different when the winning bid is revealed after each repetition. 
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1 Introduction 
Auction theory is an important area of game theoretic modeling.
1
 Since the seminal paper by 
Vickrey (1961) much theoretical work has been contributed to the study of the one-shot game 
where a single object is auctioned to a known number of bidders who have private values for 
the object. The behavior of the other bidders is unknown, only the distribution from which 
values are independently drawn is known. Assuming that bidders are risk neutral and that 
their private values are independently and uniformly distributed over the unit interval, 
Vickrey proved the equilibrium’s existence and uniqueness. In the risk neutral Nash 
equilibrium of the first-price sealed bid auction, the bid is a constant fraction of value for a 
given number of bidders and increasing in the number of bidders.
2
  
We test the risk neutral Nash equilibrium predictions of the first-price sealed-bid 
auction theory using controlled laboratory experiments where no information is revealed on 
the other bidders’ behavior. Our data show that the bid is increasing in the number of bidders, 
but less increasing than predicted by the risk neutral equilibrium. On average, we observe 
above-equilibrium bid-value ratios when the number of bidders is small and below-
equilibrium bid-value ratios when the number of bidders is large. A quartile analysis reveals 
that the bid-value ratio is not constant across the full value range for a given number of 
bidders. Over the higher value quartiles, i.e., the outcome-decisive value range, the bid-value 
ratio is in line with the risk neutral Nash equilibrium for larger markets, N > 3. We tend to 
conclude that the equilibrium does a fairly good job at describing the average behavior in our 
data over the decisive value range.   
We are not first to consider bidding behavior in the experimental first-price auction. A 
considerable body of experimental literature has been contributed to this topic for over three 
                                                 
1
 Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) surveys the theoretical literature on bidding models.  
 
2
 Grimm and Schmidt (2000) more generally show that fanning out or fanning in of bidding strategies can result 
from quasiconcave or quasiconvex preferences.  
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decades (see surveys by Kagel 1995; Kagel and Levin 2008). The most famous stylized fact 
of the literature on experimental first price auctions is that average bids exceed the risk 
neutral Nash equilibrium prediction. Our results are in disagreement with the stylized fact, 
apparently because of the differences to the conventionally used design.  Most experimental 
studies investigate small markets in a repeated-game design in which feedback is given on 
the high bid and the private profits after each repetition. We use a feedback-free design to 
study the behavior of the one-shot game,
3
 and look at rather large markets compared to the 
literature.
4
 Several studies have investigated the stylized fact suggesting that risk attitudes 
(Cox et al. 1982a, b, 1988; Chen and Plott 1998; Grimm and Schmidt 2000; Andreoni et al. 
2007; Kirchkamp et al. 2008),
5
 cognitive and probability misjudgment (Goeree et al. 2002; 
Dorsey and Razzolini 2003; Crawford and Iriberri 2007; Armantier and Treich 2009; 
Kirchkamp and Reiss 2011), and feedback-responsive learning dynamics (Selten and Buchta 
1999; Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2002; Güth et al. 2003; Ockenfels and Selten 2005; 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007; Neugebauer and Selten 2006) may be its drivers. This 
paper relates to the latter study as we disable feedback-responsive dynamics in the feedback-
free design. 
Neugebauer and Selten (2006) study behavior of subjects who play against 
computerized competitors. They suggest that bidding above the risk neutral equilibrium is an 
                                                 
3
 There is evidence from various experimental environments that repeated interaction with feedback influences 
decision-making. The feedback-free approach is the state-of-the-art approach in the experimental literature on 
individual decision making under risk and uncertainty (Hey 1991; Camerer 1995). A treatment effect between 
feedback-free and repeated-game approach was reported for different experimental environments including 
public goods (Neugebauer et al. 2009), guessing games (Weber 2003, Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), sequential 
first price auctions (Neugebauer 2004), and single-unit first price auctions (Neugebauer and Perote 2008).  
 
4
 One contribution of our study is that we consider comparatively large number of bidders, including N = 14 and 
N = 21. Most studies on the first price auction focused on a rather small number of bidders, N  4, exceptions 
are reported below. 
 
5
  Under the assumption that the bidders exhibit constant relative risk aversion and the risk-aversion measures 
are independently drawn from a commonly known distribution, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been 
shown (Cox et al. 1982a). In equilibrium, bids are above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium and are positively 
correlated with the degree of individual risk aversion. 
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adaptive response, highly influenced by the feedback on the others’ bids.6 On average they 
observe bid-value ratios below rather than above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, thus also 
in disagreement with the aforementioned stylized fact. This observation is dominated by the 
behavior of larger market sizes, since average bids are frequently above the equilibrium 
prediction when N = 3. Neugebauer and Perote (2008) showed for the market with N = 7 
bidders in the feedback-free human-competitors setting that average bids move towards the 
risk-neutral equilibrium prediction, whereas in the repeated-game design average bids exceed 
the risk-neutral level. In contrast to Neugebauer and Selten (2006) our design involves human 
competitors, uniformly distributed private values independently drawn from the unit interval, 
and no feedback on others’ bids in any repetition. We thus extend the feedback-free 
approach, as used in Neugebauer and Perote, to the study of market-size effects,
7
 and report 
quartile analyses for both between-subject variation with N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14} and within-
subject variation with N = {3, 7, 14, 21}. Average bid-value ratios are generally not 
significantly different in between-subjects and within-subjects variations for given N > 3.
8
  
Our experimental design relates also to early experimental work on the first-price 
sealed-bid auctions where the effect of increased competition was studied in the repeated-
game design. Cox et al. (1982a, 1988), and Kagel and Levin (1993) studied the effects of 
varying number of bidders in a between-subjects design, and Dyer et al. (1989) and Battalio 
et al. (1990) used a within-subjects design, N ≤ 10. The results reported in the literature 
                                                 
6
 In Neugebauer and Selten, the subject’s value was fixed at unity and computerized competitors’ bids were 
independently drawn from the uniform distribution over the unit interval. In between-subject variation three 
feedback conditions were examined in different market sizes N = {3, 4, 5, 6, 9}; (1) winning bid and 
competitors’ highest bid, (2) winning bid, (3) winning bid only if subject wins. Above-equilibrium bidding was 
the average action in condition (2) for all N, and in the conditions (1) and (3) for N ≤ 4.   
 
7
 Related experimental studies of oligopolistic markets also showed that competitive pressures increase with the 
number of oligopolists (Huck et al. 2000; Huck et al. 2004; Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000; Abbink and Brandts 
2008; Brandts and Guillen 2007). In a remotely related theoretical and now classical paper, Selten (1973) 
suggested that quite extreme competition-effects can occur in oligopolies. 
 
8
 For the high value quartile in the small market size, N = 3, the bid-value ratios are higher in within-subjects 
variation. This evidence seems to suggest that behavior in small markets is quite sensitive to variations. 
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suggest that the tendency of above-equilibrium bidding may be less intense for a larger 
number of bidders even in the repeated-game design. We present also some data on the 
repeated-game design for N = {7, 10} that point to similar effects. The quartile analysis 
applied to the repeated-game design shows in agreement with the stylized fact that bids 
exceed the risk neutral equilibrium on the decisive value quartiles. We conclude that the 
stylized fact of bidding above equilibrium describes well the average behavior of the 
repeated-game design, and that bidding at equilibrium describes well the average behavior of 
the feedback-free design, N > 3. With or without feedback the qualitative result of a positive 
relationship between bids and the number of bidders seems to be supported for a broad range 
of market sizes. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the testable hypotheses 
implied by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. Sections three and four inform on our 
experiments in the feedback-free design with between-subjects and within-subjects variation, 
respectively. The fifth section reports the repeated-game design control experiment. The sixth 
section summarizes the results and concludes the paper.  
 
2 Testable hypotheses: the equilibrium bid-value ratio 
Assume N bidders participate in a first-price sealed-bid auction for which all of the individual 
private values (vi ) are independently drawn from a rectangular distribution over the unit 
interval,  1;0~ Uvi . Given each bidder i is risk-neutral, Vickrey (1961) showed existence 
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (hereafter RNNE). Let (bi) denote the individual bid, 
bidders homogeneously apply the following bid–value ratio in the RNNE.  
N
N
v
b
i
i 1    (1) 
The following testable hypotheses are immediately derived from the equilibrium prediction. 
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(H1) For any given N, the individual bid-value ratio is constant.  
(H2) The bid-value ratio is increasing in N. 
(H3) Observed bid-value ratios are equal to the RNNE.  
Beyond that, we expect different results than have been reported before in the repeated-game 
design (Cox et al. 1982a, 1988; Dyer et al. 1989; Battalio et al. 1990; Kagel and Levin 1993). 
In particular, we expect that the bid-value ratio in the feedback-free design is lower than in 
the repeated-game design. Our reason for changed expectation is that in the repeated-game 
design ex-post best-reply dynamics (Selten and Buchta 1999) may account for the previous 
high bid of the others. These adaptive dynamics are shut off in the feedback-free approach 
enabling learning only by introspection (Weber 2003). Nonetheless, in line with the risk 
neutral equilibrium (1), where information revealed in hindsight on the behavior of the others 
has no relevance, we state our fourth hypothesis.  
(H4) The bid-value ratio is the same in between-subjects and within-subjects 
variation, and the same for the feedback-free design and the repeated-game design. 
Besides referring to the results already reported in the literature, we evaluate this hypothesis 
also with some data from a control experiment with feedback on the high-bid after each 
repetition. 
3 Experiment 1: between-subjects variation 
3.1 The procedures 
The first experiment involves between-subject variation. It is computerized conducted using 
zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Each subject is exposed to one treatment condition only. The 
treatment conditions are described by the number of bidders N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14}. At the 
beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns participants to an experimental 
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auction market of size N. The subjects anonymously compete within the same market for 50 
experimental auction periods. In each auction period, individual private values are 
independently and uniformly drawn from the interval [0, 1], multiplied by 100 and rounded to 
the next integer.
9
 Given the value, the subject submits a non-negative integer bid at or below 
that value. According to the first-price auction rule, the winning bidder pays a price equal to 
her bid. In the case of a tie, the winner of the auction is randomly chosen among the high 
bidders. The bids, however, are private; subjects receive no information feedback on the 
winning bid or any other bid, and they are not informed about their payoff in any period. 
Only after the final period, that is, after 50 periods of bidding, subjects are posted their total 
payoff. During the experiment, each subject has an on-screen record of her own previous 
private values and bids.  
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics 
EXEC (The University of York, UK), and at the Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany. 
At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects were given written instructions.
10
  First 
subjects read the instructions themselves, thereafter, the experimenter read them aloud. 
Questions were answered. Finally, the participants were introduced to the simple interface on 
their computer screens. At the end of the experiment, subjects were privately paid their 
cumulative payoff plus a show-up fee of £3 sterling and €5, respectively. The average payoff 
was £9 and €13 (about the same amount), respectively; including instructional reading, the 
experiment was completed within an hour and a quarter.
11
 
3.2 Results 
                                                 
9
 This way of presenting the problem is theoretically equivalent to having values and bids over the unit interval 
rounded to the second decimal. As reported below, a finer scale has been applied in the experiment for within-
subjects variation.  
 
10
 The instructions are appended to the paper.  
 
11
 The reported task was the first one of several tasks in an experimental session.  
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In total, 110 first-year students participated in the experiment; 12, 15, 28, 27 and 28 subjects 
participated in the market of size N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14}, respectively. Since there was no 
information flow between the subjects, the data of each subject are treated as an independent 
observation. The number of participants therefore indicates the number of independent 
observations per treatment.
12
  
The treatment averages of the individual bid–value ratio are recorded in Table 1; zero 
values are treated as missing observations.
13
 The first and second columns in the table record 
the number of bidders N and the number of independent observations, respectively; the third 
column records the RNNE bid-value ratio; and the fourth one the observed average bid–value 
ratio. The fifth column records the differences between the observed and the predicted bid–
value ratios, where the attached asterisk indicates significance of these differences according 
to the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The test-results are summarized as follows.  
Observation 1 
a) The data indicate bidding both above and below the RNNE.  
b) The bid–value ratio increases with N.  
c) The difference between the bid-value ratio and the RNNE decreases with N.  
Support:  
a) The positive and negative signs in the last column of Table 1 indicate bidding above 
(for N = 3) and below (N  7) the RNNE, respectively. The recorded p-values show 
that the differences are significant at the 10% level for N  5.14  
                                                 
12
 The experiment conducted at York involved market size N = 7 only. In York, the participants were from 
different fields of study, while in Hannover all participants were economics students. For the market size N = 7 
(the data including some replies to the debriefings are detailed in Neugebauer and Perote 2008), there were no 
significant behavioral differences between the samples from Hannover and York. Therefore, we include the data 
from York in the sample. As a matter of fact, the stated observations do not change if these data are excluded. 
 
13
 In experiment 1, in 58 of 5,500 random draws the outcome was a zero private value; in experiment 2: we had 
4 zero draws of 12,600 draws. In experiment 3, the private value was always positive. 
 
14
 Exact p-values are 0.071, 0.211, 0.065, 0.005, and 0.000, for N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14} respectively.  
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b) The one-tailed Jonckheere–Terpstra test for ordered alternatives (see e.g. Conover 
1999) rejects the null hypothesis that all samples come from the same distribution in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis (H2) that the bid-value ratio weakly increases 
with N; the p-value is 0.033.
15
  
c) As shown in Table 1 the difference of the observed bid-value ratio and the RNNE 
prediction is positive for N = 3 and smaller for larger N. The two-tailed Jonckheere–
Terpstra test supports the alternative hypothesis that the differences are significantly 
increasing in N at any conventional significance level; the p-value is 0.000. The 
propensity of bidding above the RNNE thus decreases when N increases.  
Observation 1b) agrees with earlier results of increasing bid-value ratios, and supports the 
theoretical predictions, as hypothesized in (H2). Observation 1a) and 1c) challenge 
hypothesis (H3). Observation 1c) is in line with previous results on the repeated game design 
(Battalio et al 1990). Observation 1a), in contrast, is disagreeing with the results of the 
literature on the repeated-game design for N > 3, where above-equilibrium bidding is the 
stylized fact (Kagel 1995).
16
 According to our observation, the stylized fact of the repeated-
game design does not describe the behavior of the first-price sealed-bid auction in the 
feedback-free experiment. Already, for rather small N (e.g., N = 5), the average bid–value 
ratio is not significantly above the RNNE.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15
 The null hypothesis that all samples come from the same distribution is tested against the ordered alternative 
that bids weakly increase with N with at least one inequality. The test is conducted one-tailed as the prediction 
of the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium indicates an increase of the bid-value ratio. 
 
16
 In the repeated first-price auction experimental design that reveals at least the winning bid after each period, 
average bidding above the RNNE results for all market sizes N  10. Experimental markets with more than 10 
participants have not been investigated before.  
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Table 1: Average and RNNE bid–value ratio overall values 
N 
Number of 
observations 
RNNE 
ratio 
Bid–value ratio  
(std. dev.) 
Bid–value ratio 
minus RNNE ratio
 a)
 
     
3 12 0.667 0.755 
(0.145) 
 
0.088
*
 
5 15 0.800 0.809 
(0.137) 
 
0.009 
7 28 0.857 0.827 
(0.071) 
 
-0.030
*  
 
9 27 0.889 0.832 
(0.101) 
 
-0.057
***
 
14 28 0.929 0.842 
(0.100) 
-0.087
***
 
     
a) 
Asterisks indicate results of the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests; H0: 
(b/v) = RNNE ratio; H1: (b/v)  RNNE ratio;  
*
 significant at 10%; 
**
 significant at 5%; 
***
 significant at 1% 
 
3.3 Value-quartiles analysis 
The experimental literature on the first-price auction has suggested for the repeated game 
design that subjects’ bids exceed the RNNE if they have a high probability of winning, but 
they may not necessarily do so if they have a low probability of winning (Cox et al. 1988; 
Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou 2007; Kirchkamp et al. 2008; Kirchkamp and Reiss 2011). 
To check the robustness of observation 1, therefore, the average bid–value ratio in the data of 
the present study is re-examined in conditions of a high probability of winning.   
To investigate the robustness of observation 1, therefore, we segment the value range 
into quartiles, and report the bid-value ratio for each of the value quartiles {1,..,25}, 
{26,..,50}, {51,..,75}, and {76,..,100}. Corresponding to the last column of Table 1, Table 2 
displays the average difference between the observed bid-value ratio and the RNNE bid-value 
ratio for each quartile.
17
  
                                                 
17
 The individual average bid-value ratios are recorded in table A1 of the appendix for each quartile and overall. 
Confirming results to the reported ones are obtained if one examines the behavior conditional on being assigned 
the highest value who is expected to win in the efficient market (see Neugebauer 2007), or if one considers only 
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Observation 2 
a) For given N, the bid-value ratio is constant only for the two high value quartiles. 
b) For the high value quartiles, the bid-value ratio is different from the RNNE for N = 3 only. 
c) For the three high value quartiles, the bid-value ratio increases in N.  
d) For each value quartile, the difference between observed and RNNE bid-value ratio is 
decreasing in N.  
Support:  
a) Pairwise two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests rejects the null-hypothesis of no 
differences in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the bid-value ratio is different 
on the lower three quartiles; the p-values are below 0.001 pooling all observations (n 
= 110).
18
 The bid-value ratio is not significantly different across the two high value 
quartiles (p = 0.3863), and the statistical power of this result is 0.653. 
b) The asterisks in Table 2 indicate significant differences between the bid-value ratio 
and the RNNE ratio according to the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. For the two high 
value quartiles, the difference between the observed and the RNNE bid-value ratios 
is statistically significant only in the case of N = 3.  
c) The one-tailed Jonckheere–Terpstra test for ordered alternatives supports the 
alternative hypothesis that the bid-value ratio is increasing in N for each but the low 
value quartile.
19
  
                                                                                                                                                        
bids of high values like equal to or above 90, or considering only values which in the RNNE have at least a 
probability of winning of 0.25 (this would involve values of at least 50 in the market with N = 3; it would 
involve values of at least 71 in the market with N = 5; etc.). 
 
18
 Splitting the data by group size yields significant differences between the first and the second quartile for N > 
3 (p < 0.015), and between second and third quartile for N > 5 (p < 0.015). None of the sessions show a 
significant effect on the 5% significant level between the third and the fourth quartile. 
 
19
 P-values are 0.722, 0.017, 0.000, and 0.000, for N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14} respectively. 
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d) The two-tailed Jonckheere–Terpstra test supports for each value segment the 
alternative hypothesis that the differences between the observed and the RNNE bid–
value ratio change with increasing N at any conventional significance level; the p-
value is 0.000.  
According to observation 2a) the hypothesis of constant bid-value ratio (H1) must be 
generally rejected, however, it is supported for the two high value quartiles. The test also 
suggest that the bidding below the RNNE in observation 1a) is influenced by the bid-value 
ratio over the low value quartiles. For the high value quartiles, the average bid-value ratio is 
not significantly different from the RNNE. In general, neglecting the low value quartile, the 
reported results (observations 2c and 2d) agree with observation 1. So we conclude that 
generally and in particular as N increases, observation 2 suggests that the evidence against the 
RNNE looks weak on the outcome-decisive value segment. Compared to the stylized fact of 
the repeated-game design of above-equilibrium bidding, the RNNE describes better the 
behavior of the feedback-free design.  
 
Table 2: Difference of average and RNNE bid–value ratio by quartiles a) 
N 
 
Number of 
observations 
Value segment 
{1,..,25} 
Value segment 
{26,..,50} 
Value segment  
{51,..,75} 
Value segment 
{76,..,100} 
      
3 12 0.065 0.106
**
 0.109
**
 0.088
*
 
  (0.167) (0.137) (0.159) (0.141) 
      
5 15 -0.018 0.030 0.031 0.005 
  (0.154) (0.145) (0.119) (0.162) 
      
7 28 -0.091
***
 -0.034 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.092) (0.098) (0.090) (0.082) 
      
9 27 -0.130
***
 -0.056
*
 -0.024 -0.019 
  (0.156) (0.117) (0.117) (0.095) 
      
14 28 -0.192
***
 -0.075
***
 -0.039 -0.040 
  (0.109) (0.139) (0.111) (0.101) 
      
a) 
Asterisks indicate results of the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests; H0: (b/v) = RNNE ratio; 
H1: (b/v)  RNNE ratio.
*
 significant at 10%; 
**
 significant at 5%; 
***
 significant at 1%, (standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
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4 Experiment 2: within-subjects variation 
4.1 The procedures 
In each period of the within-subject experiment, subjects receive one private value 
independently and uniformly drawn from the unit interval, multiplied by 10,000 and rounded 
to the next integer. Subjects simultaneously submit non-negative integer bids to four auctions. 
In contrast to the between-subjects experiment, subjects are permitted to submit bids above 
their value.
20
 However, we observe no bid above value in the experiment.  
Each experimental session involves 21 subjects who simultaneously bid in four markets 
with the following number of bidders; N = {3, 7, 14, 21}. The composition of each market is 
determined at the beginning, and does not change during the experiment.
21
 To avoid 
diversification effects, one of the four markets is decisive for the period-gain of the subject. 
The payoff-decisive market is randomly determined in each period.  
The within-subjects design involves the feedback-free approach, too. Only individual 
values and the bids are recorded after each period. The price in the payoff-relevant market 
and the generated period-gains are disclosed only at the end of the experiment after 50 
periods. The corresponding cumulated payoffs are paid out privately. 
The experiment was computerized (Fischbacher 2007), conducted at the EconLab, 
Unversity of Bonn. Two conditions were considered. In the constant-pay condition, the unit 
payoff on the 10,000 scale is constant at 0.150 Eurocents. In the increasing-pay condition, the 
unit payoff increases in N = {3, 7, 14, 21}, yielding {0.050, 0.233, 0.875, 1.925} Eurocent, 
                                                 
20
 To avoid unintended bidding above value, each such bid requires an extra confirmation by the subject. 
 
21
 The software implemented the following matching protocol which was not explained in detail to subjects. 
Subjects are randomly assigned numbers {1, 2,.., 21}. The subjects of the first three numbers are matched in the 
first market of size N = 3, the second three numbers are assigned to the second market, etc. Similarly, for the 
market size N = 7; the first seven numbers are assigned to the first market, etc. For market size N = 14, the first 
fourteen numbers are assigned to the first market. The numbers {15,…, 21} are assigned to the second. This 
market of size N = 14 is completed with the bids of the subjects numbered {8,…, 14}, whose bids are relevant 
for the price determination in that second market, but whose payoffs are exclusively determined in the first 
market of size N = 14. Finally, each subject submits a bid to the market of size N = 21. 
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respectively. The expected payoff in the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is the same across 
treatment conditions (approximately 0.40 Euro per period), and is also the same for each 
number of bidders in the increasing-pay condition. The per-unit payoffs were communicated 
to subjects in the experimental instructions (see appendix). We expected opposite bidding 
biases in the two conditions. In the increasing-pay condition, we imagined that subjects 
would be biased towards increasing their bids in N, whereas in the constant-pay condition, 
they would be biased towards decreasing their bids in N. Therefore, we conducted both 
treatments, but found no treatment effect.
22
 
4.2 Results 
The data contain 42 independent observations. As we observe no treatment effect between the 
constant-pay condition and the increasing-pay condition, we report on the pooled data. Each 
independent observation involves 50 periods, for which we observe one private value and 
four bids, one for each N = {3, 7, 14, 21}. By participating to the experiment, subjects earned 
on average 13.38 Euro including a show-up fee of 5 Euro. The session took 1 hour and 15 
minutes to complete. 
The results of the within-subjects experiment confirm the two observations of the 
between-subjects design. 
Observation 3 
a) For given N, the bid-value ratio is constant for the two high value quartiles. 
b) The individual bid-value ratio increases in N. 
c) The difference between observed and RNNE bid-value ratio is decreasing in N for each 
value quartile. 
                                                 
22
 Comparing the bid-value ratios for the within-subject experiment between conditions, we find that the 
increasing-pay treatment generates higher averages than the constant-pay treatment. However, only for the low-
value quartile these differences are significant at the five percent significance level. We conduct a two-tailed 
Mann Whitney test for the comparison of the bid-value ratio across treatment conditions. The p-values of the 
test conducted on the low value quartile are {0.046, 0.044, 0.024, 0.031} for N = {3, 7, 14, 21}. 
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d) We generally find no treatment effect between our two feedback-free approaches, i.e., the 
within-subjects variation and the between-subjects variation. However, we find one 
difference for the high value quartile in the market of size N = 3.  
Support:  
a) Table 3 records the average differences of the average bid-value ratio from the 
RNNE ratio for the varied number of bidders. For all group sizes, the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test rejects the null hypothesis of equal bid-value ratios comparing the 
first and second quartile (p < 0.001), and comparing the second and third quartile (p 
< 0.03). However, the tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal bid-value ratios 
between the two high value quartiles ( p > 0.333).  
 
b) Comparing bid-value ratios across group sizes the one-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test accepts the alternative hypothesis that the bid-value ratio increases in N. The 
tests are conducted on the overall averages as well as on each quartile; p-values 
below 0.002 for each of the pairwise tests. 
Table 3: Difference of average and RNNE bid–value ratio by quartiles b) 
 
N
 a)
 
 
Overall values 
{1,..,10000} 
Value segment 
{1,..,2500} 
Value segment 
{2501,..,5000} 
Value segment 
{5001,..,7500} 
Value segment 
{7501,..,10000} 
      
3 0.138
***
 0.047
**
 0.147
***
 0.176
***
 0.178
***
 
 (0.122) (0.190) (0.140) (0.128) (0.115) 
      
7 -0.032 -0.117
***
 -0.035 0.010 0.005
**
 
 (0.132) (0.194) (0.179) (0.128) (0.122) 
      
14 -0.076
***
 -0.159
***
 -0.082
***
 -0.037 -0.036 
 (0.129) (0.197) (0.183) (0.113) (0.115) 
      
21 -0.074
***
 -0.156
***
 -0.079
**
 -0.039 -0.032 
 (0.124) (0.200) (0.180) (0.106) (0.105) 
      
a) 
Averages are computed on 42 independent observations. (Standard deviations in parentheses). 
b) 
Asterisks indicate results of the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests; H0: (b/v) = RNNE ratio; H1: (b/v)  
RNNE ratio. 
*
 significant at 10%; 
**
 significant at 5%; 
***
 significant at 1% 
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c) The second column of Table 3 reports also the average differences by value quartile. 
As indicated by the asterisks in the first column, the two-sided Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test rejects the null hypothesis that the bid-value ratio is at the RNNE for all 
market sizes but N = 7. The bid-value ratio is significantly above the RNNE for N = 
3 (p-value is 0.000), and significantly below the RNNE for N = 14 (p-value is 
0.002), and N = 21 (p-value is 0.003). However, the bid-value ratios for the two high 
value quartiles are not significantly different from the RNNE for N  14.  
d) Comparing the bid-value ratio of the two experiments for market-sizes {3, 7, 14}, 
we find no significant differences of the between-subjects and within-subjects 
experiments for most value segments. Significant differences between pay 
conditions are observed for the high value quartile when N = 3.
23
 The p-value of the 
two-tailed Mann Whitney test is 0.023. 
 
5 Repeated-game design control experiment 
As a control observation, we report some data on the conventional repeated-game design with 
large market sizes N = {7, 10}. The outcomes on smaller markets are well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Kagel 1995), and are not further detailed here. The report on N = {7, 10} in 
the repeated-game design should give an idea about the behavioral differences to the 
feedback-free design. In the described experimental sessions, each subject participates to one 
market for 50 subsequent periods. After each period the subject receives feedback on the 
winning bid and on the personal period gain.  
                                                 
23
 The p-values of the two-tailed Mann Whitney test are {0.901, 0.349, 0.183, 0.023, 0.261} for N = 3, {0.737, 
0.240, 0.166, 0.401, 0.323} for N = 7, {0.068, 0.420, 0.590, 0.692, 0.181} for N = 14, where the first p-value in 
the curly brackets represents the first quartile, the second quartile, …, the fourth quartile; finally, the last p-value 
represents the two sample test of bid-value ratios for the corresponding number of bidders. 
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5.1 The procedures 
The experiment of market size N = 10 was computerized (Fischbacher 2007), conducted at 
the NSM Decision Lab, Radboud University Nijmegen. In the session, we had 2 auction 
groups.
24
  
In each period subjects’ private values are independently and uniformly drawn from the 
unit interval multiplied by 10,000 and rounded to the next integer. Subjects are permitted to 
submit bids above their value. The cumulated payoffs are paid out in private at the end of the 
experiment. By participating, subjects earned on average 9 Euro including show-up fee. The 
session took one hour to complete.  
The experimental data of market size N = 7 involves 8 groups. The data was collected 
in experiments at EXEC, University of York, and at the University of Hannover. It is 
identical to the data (INFO) reported in Neugebauer and Perote (2008). The value support 
was {0,…,100}, and bidding above value was inhibited. 
5.2 Results 
The data consist of 10 independent observations. The difference of the observed average from 
the RNNE bid-value ratios are recorded by quartile in Table 4 corresponding to the earlier 
tables. To test the effects for significance, however, we apply a one-tailed binomial sign test, 
the results of which are recorded in the bottom line of the table. Generally, the statistical 
power is limited due to the small number of independent observations in the repeated-game 
design. Still we think that the reported evidence correctly indicates the direction.  
Observation 4 
a) For the high value quartiles, the difference of average observed bid-value ratio and RNNE 
is different from zero. 
                                                 
24
 Unfortunately there was a high no show rate, such that we were not able have data from a third group. 
However, as the results are quite clear, we refrained of running a further session. 
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b) For the two high value quartiles, i.e., the decisive value range, we find a treatment effect 
of the bid-value ratio between the repeated-game design and the feedback-free design. 
Support:  
a) The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 report the difference between the observed 
average bid-value ratio and the RNNE over the two high value quartiles. Note, that 
the bid-value deviations from the RNNE are positive for each session. The 
likelihood that this result is due to chance is 0.001. This result is reported in the 
bottom line of the table. Note that on the lower two quartiles and overall, the 
observed bid-value ratio is not significantly larger than the RNNE. The effect on the 
N = 7 sample, however, is significantly positive; in 6 of 8 sessions the average bid-
value ratio exceeds the RNNE.
25
  
b) For the comparison between the feedback-free design and the repeated-game design 
we must look at comparable market sizes. Arguably the toughest test of our 
hypothesis compares the outcomes of the repeated-game design with the within-
subject data for market size N = 7. The average bid-value ratio exceeds the RNNE 
30 of 42 times on the high value quartile. According to the Fisher exact test, the 
difference to the repeated-game design where each of the 10 average bid-value ratios 
is above equilibrium is significant; the p-value is .054. The p-value for the second 
highest value quartile is 0.040. Compared to the between-subject data with 
comparable markets sizes N = {7, 9} the p-values are 0.026 and 0.059, respectively. 
On the overall-values sample with N = {7, 9}, we find no significant differences 
between the feedback-free and the repeated-game design as the p-values are 0.525 
and 0.582 on the within-subject and between-subjects sample, respectively. If we 
                                                 
25
 In line with earlier results on the repeated-game design, this observation suggest that the difference of average 
bid-value ratio from the RNNE may decrease with an increasing number of bidders.  
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consider N = 9 only the difference, however, is significant on the overall-values 
sample (p = 0.084) .
26
    
 
Table 4: Difference of average and RNNE bid–value ratio by quartiles b) 
 
N
 a) 
(group ID) 
 
Overall values 
{1,..,10000} 
Value segment 
{1,..,2500} 
Value segment 
{2501,..,5000} 
Value segment 
{5001,..,7500} 
Value segment 
{7501,..,10000} 
      
10 -0.007 -0.094 -0.007 0.029 0.022 
(1) (0.062) (0.201) (0.083) (0.040) (0.041) 
      
10 -0.028 -0.161 -0.004 0.036 0.008 
(2) (0.077) (0.246) (0.051) (0.024) (0.028) 
      
7 -0.025 -0.233 -0.015 0.096 0.076 
(3) (0.141) (0.309) (0.227) (0.021) (0.017) 
      
7 0.032 -0.065 0.047 0.080 0.073 
(4) (0.075) (0.181) (0.099) (0.041) (0.019) 
      
7 0.047 -0.007 0.039 0.067 0.075 
(5) (0.085) (0.123) (0.113) (0.075) (0.037) 
      
7 0.044 -0.054 0.060 0.081 0.077 
(6) (0.045) (0.107) (0.044) (0.025) (0.028) 
      
7 -0.026 -0.193 -0.002 0.044 0.041 
(7) (0.067) (0.158) (0.062) (0.075) (0.047) 
      
7 0.019 -0.043 0.029 0.048 0.041 
(8) (0.077) (0.185) (0.096) (0.067) (0.048) 
      
7 0.069 0.018 0.088 0.095 0.074 
(9) (0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.037) 
      
7 0.032 -0.055 0.031 0.084 0.072 
(10) (0.049) (0.128) (0.061) (0.040) (0.052) 
      
      
Pos./neg. 
Deviations 6/4 1/9 6/4 10/0 10/0 
 
Binomial 
test result 
p-value 
 
.172 
 
 
.989 
 
 
.172 
 
 
.000
***
 
 
 
.000
***
 
 
      
a) 
Averages are computed on 10 and 7 observations for each group (standard deviations in parentheses). 
b) 
Asterisks indicate results of the one-tailed binomial sign test; H0: Prob(b/v > RNNE)  Prob(b/v < RNNE); H1: 
Prob(b/v > RNNE) > Prob(b/v < RNNE). 
***
 significant at 1% 
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 In between-subject variation only 4 observations of market size N = 7 are independent from the feedback-free 
approach (INFO1). So, the Fisher test involves the first six observations of Table 4. 
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6 Conclusions  
We have proposed to test the risk neutral equilibrium theory for the one-shot game in the 
feedback-free experimental design. The feedback-free design shares similarities with the 
strategy method (Selten 1967; Selten et al. 1997),
27
 but it aids introspective reasoning as the 
data contain repeated spontaneous choices rather than formulating predefined actions to all 
possible circumstances without having gathered even any kind of experience. In our opinion, 
this introspection agrees with the ex-ante reasoning idea of the equilibrium concept, and it 
disables the frequently reported ex-post adaptation of individual bids. To us, it appears 
difficult to control for the effects of information revealed in hindsight without considering the 
feedback-free design when testing predictions for the one-shot game. 
In contrast to the feedback-free approach, most contributions to the experimental 
literature on first-price sealed-bid auctions have applied the repeated-game design where 
feedback on outcomes is received after each repetition. The observed results between the 
approaches are strikingly different in relation to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. The 
average bid-value ratios of the feedback-free approach are rather consistent with the risk 
neutral equilibrium over the decisive range of values when the number of bidders is 
sufficiently large. We thus provide a fresh perspective on risk neutral bidding in the 
laboratory when environmental influences that result from feedback on the behavior of the 
others are removed and introspective reasoning (Weber 2003) dominates ex-post best-reply 
dynamics (e.g., Neugebauer and Selten 2006). In sharp contrast to this observation, the 
average bid-value ratios of the first price auction experiment have been consistently reported 
above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium over a varied number of bidders (Cox et al. 1982a, 
                                                 
27
 The strategy method has been applied to repeated first-price auctions with feedback information in Selten and 
Buchta (1999); Güth et al. (2003), Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2003), Kirchkamp et al. (2008); Kirchkamp et 
al. (2009); Kirchkamp and Reiss (2011).  
 
 21 
 
1988; Dyer et al. 1989; Battalio et al. 1990; Kagel and Levin 1993), and we have also 
provided some additional data to this end.  
Comparing the results of the feedback-free and the repeated-game approach we can 
confirm qualitative findings of the experimental first-price sealed-bid auction literature. First, 
it has been observed that bids increase in value (Kagel 1995; Kagel and Levin 2008); second, 
bids do not increase with the number of bidders as fast as suggested by the RNNE; and third, 
bid-value ratios are frequently below the risk neutral benchmark on the low segment of the 
value distribution (Kirchkamp and Reiss 2011). Overall in the feedback-free design, the 
average bid-value ratio indicates below-equilibrium bidding when the number of bidders is 
increased. Apparently, this effect is to some extent a consequence of the behavior on the low 
value quartile. 
For the small market size, in particular, the auction with three players, we have 
generated data for the feedback-free design only. Nonetheless, our feedback-free evidence 
and the stylized fact of the first-price auction literature suggest that above-equilibrium bids 
are representative of the behavior for both the feedback-free and the repeated-game design. 
Therefore, we think it would be worthwhile to study the models of behavioral biases 
regarding preferences (Cox et al. 1982a, b, 1988), cognition (Crawford and Iriberri 2007) and 
expectation formation and best replies (Armantier/Treich (IER 2009), Kirchkamp/Reiss 2012, 
Neri 2012) also in the feedback-free design approach. More research is needed. 
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Appendix  
A1. Instructions (between-subjects experiment) 
General Information 
1. You are about to participate in 50 rounds of an auction experiment. In each of these 
rounds, you will be assigned to a group of N bidders:
28
 yourself and 6 other participants. Your 
group will stay the same throughout the experiment. However, you will not receive any 
information about the identity of the other group members. 
2. In each of the 100 rounds, one fictitious item will be sold for which you have to submit a 
bid. A bid consists in proposing a price of purchase (i.e., an integer number between 0 and 
100). 
The Auction Rule 
3. Your bid must be always a number between 0 and 10,000. In each auction round, the 
bidder who submits the highest bid wins the auction. 
                                                 
28
 In the sessions, N was substituted by the number of participants N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14}. 
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4. If ever the highest bid is submitted by more than one bidder, the winner will be determined 
randomly. (There will be an equal chance for each of them to be selected as the winner).  
5. The winner of the auction round is awarded the item and pays a price equal to her/his bid. 
Your Payoff in an Auction Round 
5. At the outset of each auction round, the computer draws integer numbers between 0 and 
10,000 at random, one for each bidder. (These numbers are independent of each other.) 
6. One of these numbers will be assigned to you. The number represents your resale value for 
the item for sale. 
7. Your resale value is the amount the experimenter is going to pay you if you win the item in 
the auction round. 
8. Therefore, if you win the item in the market to which you participate, your round payoff 
will be equal to the difference between your resale value and your bid. If you don’t win the 
item, your round payoff will be zero. 
9. Note: In order to prevent negative payoffs, you will NOT be allowed to submit a bid above 
your resale value. 
Your Payoff in the Experiment 
10. Round payoffs, bids, prices and resale values are expressed in the Experimental Currency 
Unit ECU. 
11. At the end of the experiment you will be paid your accumulated payoff of the experiment 
privately in the adjacent office. The exchange rate will be 1 ECU = 0.0015 (constant pay 
treatment). The exchange rate differs between markets. In the 3-bidders market, 100 ECU = 
0.05 Euro; in the 7-bidders market, 100 ECU = 0.233 Euro; in the 14-bidders market, 100 
ECU = 0.875 Euro; and in the 21-bidders market, 100 ECU = 1.925 Euro. 
 
Information feedback 
12. You will not receive any information about prices or payoffs. Throughout the experiment 
you will be given an on-screen record of all information you have received in the previous 
auction rounds including values and bids. 
13. After 50 rounds, you will receive full information on prices and payoffs per period and 
overall. 
 
 
Instructions (within-subjects experiment) 
General Information 
1. You are about to participate in 50 rounds of an auction experiment. In each of these 
rounds, you will simultaneously propose a price (submit a bid) in four auction markets. You 
participate to each of the four markets with equal probability, but the actual market to which 
you participate is revealed to you only in hindsight.  
2. The four markets in which you simultaneously bid differ in the number of bidders. The 
first auction market has 3 participants (3-bidder market), the second has 7 participants (7-
bidder market), the third 14 (14-bidder market), and the fourth 21 (21-bidder market). The 
participants in each of these groups stay the same. Unless you bid in the 21-bidder market, 
however, you will not know the identity of the other group members. 
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2. In each of the 100 rounds, one fictitious item will be sold for which you have to submit a 
bid. A bid consists in proposing a price of purchase (i.e., an integer number between 0 and 
100). 
The Auction Rule 
3. In each auction round, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins the auction. 
4. If ever the highest bid is submitted by more than one bidder, the winner will be determined 
randomly. (There will be an equal chance for each of them to be selected as the winner).  
5. The winner of the auction round is awarded the item and pays a price equal to her/his bid. 
Your Payoff in an Auction Round 
5. At the outset of each auction round, the computer draws integer numbers between 0 and 
100 at random, one for each bidder. (These numbers are independent of each other.) 
6. One of these numbers will be assigned to you. The number represents your resale value for 
the item for sale. 
7. Your resale value is the amount the experimenter is going to pay you if you win the item in 
the auction round. 
8. Therefore, if you win the item, your round payoff will be equal to the difference between 
your resale value and your bid. If you don’t win the item, your round payoff will be zero. 
9. Note: In order to prevent negative payoffs, you should NOT submit a bid above your resale 
value. 
 
Your Payoff in the Experiment 
10. Round payoffs, bids, prices and resale values are expressed in the Experimental Currency 
Unit ECU. 
11. At the end of the experiment you will be paid your accumulated payoff of the experiment 
privately in the adjacent office. The exchange rate will be 1 ECU = £0.06 (UK, N = 7); 1 
ECU = € {0.05, 0.05, 0.10, 0.10, 0.20} (Germany, N = {3, 5, 7, 9, 14}).  
Information feedback 
12. You will not receive any information about prices or payoffs. 
13. Throughout the experiment you will be given an on-screen record of all information you 
have received in the previous auction rounds including values and bids. 
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A2. Tables (Data on the repeated game design are available upon request) 
Table A1: Individual average bid-value ratio by segment in between-subjects experiment 
 
             
Subject ID 
Value 
segment 
{1,..,100} 
Value 
segment 
{1,..,25} 
Value 
segment 
{26,..,50} 
Value 
segment 
{51,..,75} 
Value 
segment 
{76,..,100}  Subject ID 
Value 
segment 
{1,..,100} 
Value 
segment 
{1,..,25} 
Value 
segment 
{26,..,50} 
Value 
segment 
{51,..,75} 
Value 
segment 
{76,..,100} 
 n=3  n=9 
1 0.974 0.996 0.931 0.984 0.990  56 0.891 0.814 0.905 0.928 0.929 
2 0.701 0.667 0.710 0.761 0.664  57 0.894 0.932 0.875 0.899 0.841 
3 0.642 0.530 0.684 0.688 0.743  58 0.886 0.768 0.898 0.954 0.958 
4 0.922 0.990 0.943 0.890 0.823  59 0.882 0.887 0.927 0.916 0.826 
5 0.828 0.842 0.853 0.827 0.771  60 0.844 0.781 0.853 0.862 0.873 
6 0.609 0.629 0.682 0.556 0.571  61 0.768 0.714 0.686 0.833 0.807 
7 0.768 0.789 0.735 0.861 0.732  62 0.786 0.684 0.752 0.858 0.818 
8 0.867 0.843 0.866 0.923 0.858  63 0.838 0.646 0.854 0.926 0.937 
9 0.495 0.496 0.494 0.498 0.492  64 0.829 0.602 0.796 0.909 0.920 
10 0.842 0.689 0.876 0.930 0.914  65 0.514 0.561 0.507 0.523 0.471 
11 0.608 0.563 0.632 0.596 0.673  66 0.910 0.826 0.930 0.963 0.957 
12 0.804 0.745 0.868 0.791 0.826  67 0.781 0.737 0.777 0.798 0.811 
 0.755 0.732 0.773 0.775 0.755  68 0.693 0.577 0.635 0.764 0.851 
 n=5  69 0.854 0.812 0.838 0.867 0.901 
13 0.914 0.892 0.923 0.928 0.906  70 0.882 0.895 0.871 0.913 0.830 
14 0.879 0.797 0.891 0.911 0.885  71 0.890 0.860 0.894 0.920 0.874 
15 0.935 0.951 0.938 0.929 0.917  72 0.580 0.205 0.601 0.510 0.904 
16 0.835 0.851 0.852 0.826 0.812  73 0.753 0.763 0.703 0.743 0.823 
17 0.898 0.757 0.940 0.958 0.975  74 0.934 0.861 0.964 0.963 0.960 
18 0.468 0.409 0.460 0.573 0.466  75 0.909 0.841 0.927 0.934 0.916 
19 0.876 0.892 0.890 0.865 0.851  76 0.827 0.697 0.866 0.917 0.899 
20 0.750 0.857 0.873 0.623 0.553  77 0.908 0.839 0.960 0.959 0.945 
21 0.780 0.746 0.757 0.814 0.823  78 0.960 0.967 0.960 0.966 0.944 
22 0.738 0.690 0.730 0.794 0.824  79 0.849 0.837 0.862 0.853 0.832 
23 0.852 0.754 0.933 0.869 0.936  80 0.874 0.709 0.940 0.948 0.945 
24 0.542 0.493 0.561 0.669 0.497  81 0.874 0.959 0.841 0.820 0.820 
25 0.881 0.888 0.899 0.881 0.845  82 0.849 0.723 0.878 0.896 0.885 
26 0.919 0.939 0.886 0.927 0.909   0.832 0.762 0.838 0.871 0.866 
27 0.870 0.812 0.924 0.900 0.881  n=14 
 0.810 0.782 0.830 0.831 0.805  83 0.874 0.792 0.882 0.924 0.906 
 n=7  84 0.741 0.641 0.778 0.766 0.735 
28 0.851 0.647 0.880 0.903 0.926  85 0.720 0.703 0.634 0.760 0.792 
29 0.862 0.697 0.929 0.913 0.916  86 0.937 0.879 0.950 0.972 0.953 
30 0.913 0.837 0.899 0.956 0.950  87 0.831 0.627 0.870 0.920 0.946 
31 0.701 0.781 0.685 0.653 0.691  88 0.924 0.877 0.924 0.959 0.942 
32 0.661 0.781 0.574 0.633 0.683  89 0.897 0.822 0.903 0.934 0.943 
33 0.844 0.812 0.790 0.855 0.889  90 0.861 0.639 0.913 0.958 0.959 
34 0.854 0.810 0.783 0.890 0.919  91 0.855 0.682 0.907 0.929 0.934 
35 0.809 0.596 0.857 0.869 0.910  92 0.958 0.882 0.970 0.983 0.986 
36 0.783 0.782 0.708 0.799 0.830  93 0.876 0.651 0.901 0.942 0.935 
37 0.776 0.876 0.810 0.717 0.673  94 0.699 0.725 0.734 0.702 0.648 
38 0.903 0.921 0.924 0.922 0.856  95 0.857 0.754 0.924 0.877 0.956 
39 0.891 0.860 0.903 0.902 0.924  96 0.897 0.859 0.898 0.919 0.948 
40 0.898 0.860 0.859 0.907 0.932  97 0.878 0.752 0.882 0.921 0.925 
41 0.917 0.896 0.973 0.907 0.903  98 0.872 0.714 0.941 0.937 0.861 
42 0.741 0.585 0.746 0.804 0.818  99 0.871 0.683 0.924 0.935 0.889 
43 0.854 0.744 0.875 0.884 0.899  100 0.851 0.811 0.907 0.877 0.828 
44 0.800 0.818 0.815 0.811 0.769  101 0.892 0.862 0.900 0.881 0.910 
45 0.875 0.837 0.907 0.905 0.853  102 0.764 0.595 0.757 0.866 0.870 
46 0.839 0.844 0.788 0.880 0.839  103 0.539 0.489 0.608 0.449 0.575 
47 0.924 0.816 0.969 0.981 0.959  104 0.960 0.942 0.967 0.978 0.961 
48 0.907 0.678 0.946 0.972 0.966  105 0.876 0.765 0.898 0.922 0.935 
49 0.686 0.653 0.690 0.680 0.739  106 0.817 0.642 0.846 0.906 0.878 
50 0.791 0.696 0.749 0.835 0.865  107 0.620 0.598 0.320 0.826 0.769 
51 0.834 0.807 0.831 0.851 0.855  108 0.963 0.841 0.970 0.984 0.975 
52 0.796 0.678 0.767 0.895 0.844  109 0.887 0.743 0.933 0.967 0.972 
53 0.831 0.704 0.858 0.869 0.889  110 0.854 0.660 0.862 0.914 0.944 
54 0.762 0.651 0.687 0.845 0.889   0.842 0.737 0.854 0.890 0.888 
55 0.871 0.796 0.849 0.922 0.907        
 0.827 0.767 0.823 0.856 0.860        
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Table A2: Individual average bid-value ratio by segment in within-subjects experiment – constant-pay condition 
      
 
 
Value segment 
{1,..,10000} 
 
Value segment 
{1,..,2500} 
 
Value segment 
{2501,..,5000} 
 
Value segment 
{5001,..,7500} 
 
Value segment 
{7501,..,10000} 
 
Subject ID n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 N=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 
111 0.790 0.807 0.855 0.883 0.697 0.718 0.741 0.757 0.798 0.756 0.879 0.928 0.836 0.878 0.912 0.936 0.846 0.883 0.914 0.946 
112 0.886 0.910 0.931 0.981 0.740 0.793 0.843 0.942 0.934 0.920 0.907 0.991 0.953 0.972 0.986 0.994 0.872 0.912 0.947 0.989 
113 0.641 0.664 0.708 0.765 0.447 0.517 0.557 0.638 0.570 0.583 0.681 0.746 0.770 0.758 0.775 0.822 0.859 0.870 0.905 0.928 
114 0.949 0.949 0.950 0.958 0.914 0.914 0.915 0.921 0.940 0.940 0.942 0.949 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.972 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.985 
115 0.824 0.868 0.899 0.932 0.821 0.877 0.882 0.884 0.839 0.885 0.924 0.958 0.803 0.862 0.912 0.959 0.831 0.846 0.865 0.906 
116 0.805 0.858 0.913 0.968 0.670 0.754 0.843 0.933 0.846 0.894 0.938 0.983 0.891 0.924 0.958 0.992 0.920 0.943 0.970 0.993 
117 0.750 0.793 0.843 0.876 0.611 0.651 0.727 0.759 0.711 0.772 0.834 0.875 0.832 0.871 0.904 0.930 0.870 0.893 0.919 0.946 
118 0.655 0.694 0.730 0.770 0.264 0.273 0.278 0.283 0.767 0.809 0.845 0.883 0.742 0.802 0.855 0.900 0.739 0.776 0.828 0.900 
119 0.773 0.757 0.751 0.743 0.668 0.606 0.570 0.569 0.700 0.699 0.702 0.681 0.814 0.805 0.816 0.805 0.860 0.852 0.845 0.846 
120 0.808 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.642 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.922 0.924 0.924 0.924 
121 0.603 0.585 0.623 0.633 0.766 0.798 0.813 0.813 0.649 0.635 0.662 0.673 0.495 0.569 0.618 0.634 0.615 0.421 0.470 0.476 
122 0.773 0.768 0.764 0.766 0.600 0.601 0.601 0.602 0.795 0.782 0.782 0.785 0.860 0.861 0.848 0.849 0.786 0.771 0.776 0.785 
123 0.823 0.866 0.889 0.929 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.913 0.814 0.885 0.864 0.912 0.830 0.886 0.928 0.966 0.734 0.780 0.868 0.938 
124 0.781 0.816 0.852 0.886 0.639 0.679 0.725 0.774 0.831 0.868 0.907 0.939 0.878 0.912 0.936 0.961 0.887 0.914 0.940 0.962 
125 0.926 0.942 0.963 0.977 0.808 0.851 0.904 0.944 0.951 0.959 0.973 0.983 0.959 0.971 0.979 0.986 0.966 0.973 0.983 0.990 
126 0.839 0.882 0.921 0.956 0.591 0.689 0.776 0.868 0.867 0.907 0.943 0.972 0.921 0.946 0.967 0.983 0.940 0.958 0.976 0.988 
127 0.844 0.941 0.956 0.968 0.917 0.936 0.944 0.947 0.960 0.976 0.982 0.988 0.791 0.947 0.967 0.981 0.747 0.917 0.944 0.965 
128 0.510 0.442 0.506 0.599 0.507 0.454 0.481 0.508 0.524 0.425 0.473 0.606 0.498 0.404 0.526 0.639 0.503 0.505 0.598 0.690 
129 0.691 0.700 0.704 0.703 0.502 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.669 0.674 0.673 0.687 0.757 0.781 0.801 0.778 0.824 0.840 0.827 0.842 
130 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.910 0.910 0.910 0.910 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
131 0.637 0.740 0.824 0.910 0.260 0.459 0.619 0.744 0.687 0.786 0.862 0.947 0.742 0.815 0.895 0.969 0.827 0.877 0.901 0.968 
Average 0.775 0.798 0.827 0.856 0.661 0.691 0.722 0.754 0.795 0.809 0.838 0.872 0.817 0.845 0.875 0.899 0.834 0.849 0.874 0.903 
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Table A3: Individual average bid-value ratio by segment in within-subjects experiment – increasing-pay condition 
      
 
 
Value segment 
{1,..,10000} 
Value segment 
{1,..,2500} 
Value segment 
{2501,..,5000} 
Value segment 
{5001,..,7500} 
Value segment 
{7501,..,10000} 
Subject ID n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 N=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 n=3 n=7 n=14 n=21 
132 0.706 0.783 0.820 0.839 0.537 0.609 0.621 0.626 0.784 0.816 0.856 0.856 0.748 0.853 0.889 0.943 0.755 0.871 0.926 0.958 
133 0.630 0.628 0.651 0.686 0.571 0.565 0.547 0.584 0.608 0.529 0.598 0.646 0.632 0.714 0.774 0.744 0.708 0.688 0.663 0.762 
134 0.793 0.844 0.877 0.918 0.795 0.891 0.892 0.919 0.860 0.879 0.905 0.936 0.755 0.812 0.856 0.893 0.749 0.796 0.851 0.914 
135 0.861 0.897 0.933 0.948 0.862 0.866 0.893 0.907 0.858 0.932 0.971 0.978 0.876 0.921 0.960 0.974 0.849 0.878 0.920 0.944 
136 0.654 0.514 0.509 0.521 0.210 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.441 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.874 0.698 0.711 0.716 0.856 0.888 0.923 0.959 
137 0.811 0.842 0.873 0.922 0.753 0.796 0.822 0.886 0.788 0.822 0.860 0.915 0.872 0.882 0.903 0.931 0.849 0.879 0.916 0.955 
138 0.851 0.886 0.906 0.925 0.706 0.738 0.764 0.789 0.759 0.854 0.889 0.924 0.906 0.922 0.937 0.954 0.934 0.944 0.953 0.960 
139 0.894 0.891 0.897 0.929 0.818 0.847 0.852 0.941 0.921 0.915 0.898 0.890 0.907 0.914 0.930 0.948 0.935 0.891 0.907 0.929 
140 0.503 0.547 0.581 0.628 0.576 0.586 0.596 0.606 0.496 0.548 0.569 0.606 0.476 0.524 0.566 0.625 0.503 0.555 0.606 0.669 
141 0.985 0.967 0.985 0.985 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.995 0.866 0.995 0.995 
142 0.903 0.921 0.935 0.940 0.902 0.917 0.942 0.905 0.875 0.896 0.907 0.931 0.933 0.955 0.952 0.977 0.911 0.923 0.945 0.948 
143 0.882 0.899 0.955 0.969 0.712 0.754 0.939 0.965 0.850 0.866 0.916 0.938 0.942 0.954 0.977 0.987 0.946 0.954 0.978 0.981 
144 0.938 0.950 0.955 0.962 0.837 0.846 0.853 0.860 0.957 0.964 0.968 0.973 0.951 0.970 0.975 0.985 0.964 0.975 0.979 0.984 
145 0.902 0.929 0.952 0.982 0.815 0.865 0.914 0.980 0.949 0.971 0.984 0.990 0.958 0.964 0.969 0.981 0.964 0.975 0.977 0.980 
146 0.886 0.910 0.940 0.960 0.845 0.866 0.888 0.914 0.906 0.920 0.951 0.976 0.901 0.923 0.953 0.980 0.875 0.912 0.946 0.950 
147 0.908 0.911 0.926 0.930 0.853 0.853 0.868 0.824 0.937 0.937 0.944 0.966 0.946 0.951 0.960 0.974 0.904 0.907 0.933 0.962 
148 0.818 0.864 0.928 0.940 0.800 0.811 0.927 0.939 0.848 0.910 0.949 0.966 0.873 0.925 0.928 0.943 0.742 0.819 0.898 0.902 
149 0.790 0.835 0.889 0.961 0.763 0.824 0.881 0.956 0.768 0.790 0.855 0.937 0.816 0.867 0.901 0.970 0.820 0.864 0.921 0.983 
150 0.942 0.955 0.974 0.979 0.928 0.937 0.954 0.954 0.966 0.970 0.983 0.988 0.939 0.960 0.975 0.984 0.924 0.944 0.977 0.984 
151 0.930 0.956 0.976 0.988 0.929 0.958 0.968 0.977 0.943 0.960 0.977 0.990 0.951 0.973 0.983 0.991 0.879 0.927 0.974 0.992 
152 0.943 0.964 0.971 0.986 0.920 0.971 0.980 0.988 0.986 0.988 0.990 0.992 0.972 0.976 0.978 0.980 0.906 0.923 0.938 0.984 
Average 0.835 0.852 0.878 0.900 0.767 0.789 0.818 0.838 0.833 0.835 0.855 0.875 0.867 0.888 0.908 0.927 0.856 0.875 0.911 0.938 
